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It is hardly difficult to imagine writing about critical phenomenology and walking. One 
might pause over the method of  critical phenomenology as a meta-odos, a thinking of  the 
path. Or consider the steps critical phenomenology takes and the unique pitch of  its gait 
as it traverses the borderlands between phenomenology and critical theory. One might 
query how these two have the capacity to walk so well side by side, so much so that they 
can become as one, barely distinguishable against an open sky. Such an inquiry would 
no doubt track how it is that phenomenology walks toward things, through things, into 
things, suspending the eye of  the natural attitude and proceeding ever so carefully and 
yet bluntly in search of  what springs toward it. But such an inquiry would also track how 
that very process is a scripted processual, notwithstanding all the suspensions upon which 
it steps. Who and what writes and rewrites the script of  what appears, when, and how? 
What inscriptions define appearances in advance and diaeretically cut them clean from one 
another? And what are the unscripted forces still at work? Ferreting out the work of  scripts 
and inscriptions, such an inquiry would pause over the hidden structures that constrict 
what might feel like a free flight of  the mind, a bit of  unfettered rambling in the fields of  
consciousness. Thinking critical phenomenology as walking, then, means tracking the two 
moving in tandem. Phenomenology pulls toward the horizon of  experience, while critical 
theory veers toward structural analyses. Together, they tread a uniquely illuminating path. 
 But musing over this conjunction of  critical phenomenology and walking, the very 
structure and function of  this jointure, is not my aim in the present inquiry. Rather, I aim 
to explore a critical phenomenology of walking. The path I take, then, is a different one. It 
necessarily begins by attending to this ordinary, overly familiar act of  walking and making 
it strange, peeling away the shroud by which it appears a foregone fact and banal practice. I 
want to ask, what is it to walk? What does it look like, feel like, sound like? For whom, in what 
time and place, is it so? How is walking experienced subjectively and intersubjectively, insofar 
as we walk before, behind, and beside one another? I want to attune myself  to the way we 
walk in a world, or to the worldedness of  our walking. What are the social values and structures 
that inform and give form to who walks, where and how they walk? How is it that our walk 
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differs depending on the “we” who walks? But also, how is walking itself  a worlding? Why 
and how does walking have the power to change the social values and structures that impinge 
upon it, shaping pathways and lifeways as it goes? Embedded in this inquiry is a space for 
critical phenomenology’s ameliorative project, its capacity to transform the world it takes as 
its object. In this sense, a critical phenomenology of walking opens up a pathway for thinking 
about walking differently, in more liberatory ways. And it points back to that companion 
project for another day: rethinking (critical, phenomenological) thought as a kind of  walking. 
 In what follows, then, I sketch the contours of  a critical phenomenology of  walking. I 
begin by briefly characterizing the critical phenomenological project and marking some 
of  its invitations to think method and movement alongside one another. Then, I explore 
two modes of  doing a critical phenomenology of  walking: attending to how one walks and 
when and where one walks. I revisit and reread, in particular, the stories of  Charlie Howard 
and Latisha King, whose walks not only signaled a unique comportment in the world, but 
a comportment so offensive as to be extinguished by a fatal admixture of  homophobia, 
transphobia, and, in King’s case, racism. Finally, I close by considering the conditions 
under which a critical phenomenology of  walking can be ameliorative—that is, how it 
can participate in liberatory projects of  thinking and making. Drawing on Michel de 
Certeau and María Lugones, I argue not only that a critical phenomenology of  walking 
can diagnose how structures of  oppression constrain walking chances in the world, but also 
that it can witness how walking critiques those very structures.1 Walking can be a movement 
of  resistance and reimagination against the constraints of  embodiment and subjectivity so 
singularly inherited and enforced. Traversing the space of  this inquiry, I aim to complexify 
my understanding of  walking as a practice, but also to deepen my appreciation of  critical 
phenomenology as a method. 
 
I. THE PATH OF CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
Work in phenomenology has recently taken a critical turn; critical phenomenology is 
coming into its own. And for good reason. Phenomenology and critical theory each, in 
their own way, walk too quickly past whole realms of  things that have a clear bearing on 
their interests and inquiries. Phenomenology insists on the insight of  first-person experience. 
Focusing less on what the world is than on how it greets us, phenomenology is able to 
discern specific contours of  relation and experience that are otherwise missed. Critical 
theory, however, insists on the revelatory character of  social structures and institutions. 
Focusing less on how we feel and experience things than on how we inherit structures of  
meaning and value before we are even conscious, critical theory is able to identify social 
forces and power relations that organize our world in advance. Critical phenomenologists 
see in phenomenology and critical theory necessary companions on the path of  inquiry. 
1 By “walking chances,” I mean to invoke and extend the social science concept of  “life chances.” If  one’s 
chances to live in certain ways are uniquely constrained by social inequalities, so too are one’s chances 
to walk.
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Rich analyses of  social institutions require an account of  personal experience, just as 
personal experience is necessarily informed by those social institutions. When paired 
together in an exploratory project, more of  what is and what might be stands out in relief.  
 While many scholars have sought to distill phenomenology into an essence, it is, at its 
heart, a practice. And it is a practice poised against metaphysical idealities and certain 
scientific abstractions. Phenomenology aims to get at the root of  how things are actually 
experienced and lived. In doing so, it works to understand what appears and what allows it 
to appear as it does. What is the content and what are the conditions of  experience and 
appearance? As crystallized by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology proceeds by way of  two 
preliminary steps: the epoché and the eidetic reduction. The epoché is a bracketing of  the 
natural attitude, or the suspension of  everyday beliefs and habits that make the world as 
easily habitable as it is impossible to truly see. Following on its heels, the eidetic reduction 
focuses on the first-person perception of  an object in order to identify the essence (eidos) or 
essential structures of  human experience. These steps directly change the terrain of  inquiry. 
In Husserl’s words, the phenomenologist must “parenthesize” the “whole pre-discovered 
world” of  thought in order to open up a “phenomenological region,” a new “province” and 
“domain” which lies “in another direction” (1999, 65-7). As such, phenomenology is a 
refusal of  the paths and landscapes heretofore taken, and an insistent possibilizing of  new 
landscapes of  inquiry and pathways within them. Traversing those new landscapes requires, 
for Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a different “manner and style of  thinking,” a different 
“movement” entirely (2002, vii, xxiv). Rather than replicating the spiralized structure of  a 
reflection that only ever returns the inquirer to himself, phenomenological inquiry moves, 
through “radical reflection” and “wonder” in a starfish pattern, constantly extending the 
inquirer out into the intersubjectivities and histories by which the phenomenological world 
is steadily being produced and reproduced (xxiv).2   
 Much like phenomenology, critical theory is a practice. And it is a practice developed in 
direct resistance to naturalized habits of  both theory and critique. Too often, theory 
purports to be objective, neutral, and universal, while critique capitalizes on that distance 
to criticize from the outside. Critical theory, however, insists on thinking from the inside out. 
As Max Horkheimer argues, all theory is not outside the social but inside, produced by and 
productive of  social relations. Insofar as those relations are consistently unequal, buoyed by 
class and economic inequities, theory must be practiced critically, by “radically question[ing]” 
the state of  things here and now so as to contribute to “the abolition of  social injustice” 
(2002, 234, 241). This project of  critical theory is a two-step process: identify the conditions 
that make something what it is and mark the fault lines that allow it to become something 
else. For Michel Foucault, critical theory aims “to bring out the conditions of  acceptability 
of  a system” but also to “follow the breaking points” of  that system (1997, 54). Similarly, for 
Judith Butler, critical theory aims “to recognize the ways in which the coercive effects of  
 
2 Eugen Fink, Husserl’s steady walking companion, spoke most eloquently of  the necessity of  wonder to 
the phenomenological method.
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knowledge are at work in subject-formation itself ” but also “to risk one’s very formation as 
a subject” (2004, 320; cf. Butler 2009). Resisting the habit of  theorizing abstractly and 
judging aloofly, critical theory works to assess the systemic conditions for some things so as 
to possibilize other things. Such a practice opens up pathways heretofore shrouded, in order 
to carve out a different conceptual and social space. It highlights this whole new “domain” 
and “field” of  potential, a space of  “possible dislocations,” which can only be reached by 
traveling “the opposite route” which stretches out “in the opposite direction” (Foucault 
1997, 60-1). Tramping down these pathways requires a habit of  “curiosity” for Foucault 
(Zurn 2021, 74), not unlike the compulsive questions so distinctive of  Butler’s style. Why 
are things the way they are and how could they be otherwise?   
 Phenomenology and critical theory, then, arise from a rejection of  certain forms of  
scientific objectivity and universal theory, and a refusal to disavow embeddedness in the 
world. That is, both reject a kind of  theory that does not walk with us. As such, critical 
theory is always critique of, just as phenomenology is phenomenology of. Each is intentional, 
engaged, beholden to the thing upon which it supervenes. It theorizes by walking with. 
Critical phenomenology insists even more acutely on that embeddedness. It grants that 
power structures shape, condition, and determine experience, just as experience anchors 
(and resists) those power structures. It is also reflexive and ameliorative. It grapples with the 
situatedness of  the inquirer who commits to change and be changed in the process. For Lisa 
Guenther, the perceptual world is seen, experienced, made and remade through patriarchy, 
white supremacy, heteronormativity, and ableism (2019, 11; cf. Guenther 2013, xiii-xv). 
For this reason, the critical phenomenologist must “scrutinize,” to use Audre Lorde’s term 
(2013, 36, 41), both the patterns “that we see” and those “according to which we see” 
(Guenther 2019, 16). For Gayle Salamon, critical phenomenology’s attention to “power” is 
just as important as its “reflexivity” (2018a, 14, 12), which she characterizes as the perceptual 
openness through which one necessarily “loses” oneself  in the very process of  situating 
oneself  (2018b, 18). In this sense, the method doubles down on the tactic of  scrutiny. If  to 
scrutinize is to root through the trash (Latin, scruta), the critical phenomenologist roots 
through the waste of  power structures while recognizing that they themselves are waste-
born and waste-bred. Theorizing does not arise from a pure place; we are always complicit 
and contaminated, but also creative and generative, reclaiming meaning in the rubble and 
life from and in detritus.    
 Critical phenomenology is a way of  walking. It is a way of  walking that tries to correct 
for the missteps of  traditional theory and classical phenomenology (Salamon 2018a, 16). 
No doubt about it. But what I am trying to think, here, is a critical phenomenology of 
walking. So let me follow that thread, with its own steps and missteps. Critical phenomenology 
promises to correct for real limitations in the walking literature to date, which typically 
foregrounds a relatively disembodied, depoliticized account of  walking.3 Even nascent 
contributions to a critical phenomenology of  walking already signal the inadequacies of  
 
3 As exemplary of  this depoliticized account, see Gros (2014). As a paradigmatic critique of  this account, 
see Springgay and Truman (2019).
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such an approach. While implicitly remarking upon those limitations, my aim here, in the 
spirit of  critical phenomenologists themselves, is to turn the missteps into mit-steps of  the 
Mit-sein.4 To theorize walking between beings and within worlds. And to rebalance our 
methods, our thought tracks, so as to walk more closely in step with the human and non-
human beings with and within whom we are worlded.  
 And I hardly need an excuse. Historically, both phenomenologists and critical theorists 
have also been walkers, and some have even written substantively about walking. Take 
Edmund Husserl, for example. Several times a week, and often accompanied by Eugene 
Fink, he would walk Lorettoberg, a mountain range just south-west of  Freiburg. While 
walking, he would typically “hold forth on whatever problems were uppermost in his mind,” 
as if  exploratory thoughts were best subtended by exploratory feet (Cairns 1973, 8). Solvitur 
ambulando.5 Martin Heidegger, too, walked regularly around Marburg, as well as deep in the 
Black Forest. There he learned to attend to the contours of  a landscape and to what they 
disclose. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that he characterizes thinking as a path: “Everything 
here is the path of  a responding that examines as it listens” (2013, 184; cf. Lack 2014, 61-
62). Like phenomenology, walking, too, is a way of  moving in the world, a way of  responding 
that examines as it listens. In so moving and so listening, it must necessarily attend not only to 
present shapes, but also to histories. And it must do more than listen. Walking is also a 
keenly tuned doing, even a form of  protest. In formalizing the figure of  the flaneur, critical 
theorist and walker in exile Walter Benjamin asserts that the errant wandering of  the flaneur 
constitutes a “protest against […] production” (2002, 338). And it is precisely in that protest 
movement that the flaneur is capable of  another kind of  thinking; the flaneur “botaniz[es] on 
the asphalt,” lifting the veil of  late capitalism by attending to life as lived (372). And yet that 
protest is also productive—productive of  another sort of  living and a different economy of  
gait and gesture, meaning and mattering. As Michel de Certeau argues, walking resists and 
repatriates the rules of  urban architecture and government, deploying the turn of  the body 
as a turn of  phrase, and thereby torqueing normative scripts as it goes (1984, 91-110). It is 
to this nascent tradition of  phenomenologists and critical theorists walking—and thinking 
walking—that I aim to contribute. 
 
II. THE HOW OF WALKING 
Critical phenomenology attends to the how of  walking. How is it that walking feels and 
functions? How is it experienced by the walker and, correlatively, by the onlooker? How 
is it that walking appears, or enters the horizon of  consciousness, and how does it appear 
differently depending on the structural constraints and histories of  those horizons? How 
4 “Mit” is a German preposition meaning “with,” but also “by, at, through, in, and including.” Mit-sein, 
or being-with, is a phenomenological term that insists human existence is always companionate rather 
than independent. In speaking of  the mit-steps of  the Mit-sein, I aim to summon the thought of  being as 
walking-with.
5 Solvitur ambulando is a classic Latin phrase meaning “it is solved by walking.”
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are experiences of  walking differentially distributed across social positions, within networks 
irrevocably shaped by patriarchal and colonial histories? Indeed, how do sexism, racism, and 
ableism inform both the gait and its greeting? How do structures determine phenomena? 
And how might those structures be resisted, even changed? In asking simply “How is it 
that we walk?”, critical phenomenology attends and it listens, it botanizes and it turns. 
 Judith Butler makes a nascent contribution to a critical phenomenology of  walking 
when they recall the story of  Charlie Howard, a white gay man of  23 who was killed in 
Bangor, Maine, in 1984.6 As Butler (2006) tells it, his walk was a phenomenon unto itself, 
one fatally offensive to a homophobic society. 
He walks with what we would call a swish, a kind of, his hips move 
back and forth in a feminine way. And as he grew older that swish, 
that walk, became more pronounced, and it was more dramatically 
feminine. He started to be harassed by the boys in the town, and 
soon two or three boys stopped his walk and they fought with him 
and they ended up throwing him over a bridge and they killed him. 
So then we have to ask: why would someone be killed for the way 
they walk? Why would that walk be so upsetting to those other 
boys that they would feel that they must negate this person, they 
must expunge the trace of  this person. They must stop that walk no 
matter what. They must eradicate the possibility of  that person ever 
walking again. 
Often adorned in earrings, eye makeup, and a purse, Howard sank into the roll of  
his own hips more heavily as he embraced his queer gender and sexuality (Armstrong 
1994; cf. Anonymous 2009). There was “a little bit of  a ‘fuck you’ in the walk,” Butler 
observes, a bit of  “girling himself  in the street,” as he fiercely—and fabulously—
refused cisheterosexual constraints (2009, 204-05). His walk was a form of  embodiment 
that built belonging, with himself  and those he came to love. He rolled the square, 
circled the box. He took license. And the lived experience, the felt phenomena of  that 
license was like beginning to breathe, like catching his breath. And yet, coming to 
breathe in a world marked by compulsory cisheterosexuality can sometimes feel like 
walking in quicksand; your limbs are swallowed up and your breath is gulped away. 
 Although unremarked by Butler, Howard had asthma. Asthma is a medical condition 
in which a person’s airways become inflamed, constrict, fill with mucus, and spasm. When 
Howard was attacked on the street by three young men (one a hockey player, another 
football), that asthma was triggered by his repeated attempts to run from them and to 
endure the beating he eventually sustained. As indicated by a subsequent autopsy, Howard 
died from “asphyxiation” exacerbated by an attack of  “acute bronchial asthma” (Armstrong 
1994, 312). It is twice, then, that he could not breathe; he drowned from fluids inside and 
out. And it is twice that he could not walk; asthma buckled his knees before the river 
6 Of  the three times (to my knowledge) Judith Butler refers to this story, they do not mention the name 
Charlie Howard, nor do they always recall the story’s elements accurately. The story seems to have 
become for them an oral history, a touchstone for thinking the queer walk and its fate. See Butler (1989, 
256); Butler (2006); Butler and Taylor (2009, 204-5).  
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stopped his feet.7 It is important to pause here and appreciate the chiastic structure of  
breath in this scene. Healthy, non-asthmatic lungs expand with exertion to metabolize up 
to twenty times more oxygen than they do in a resting state (Burton, Stokes, and Hall 2004, 
186). As Howard was increasingly unable to breathe, his attackers—landing fists and kicks, 
and hoisting him over a bridge—took deeper, richer breaths. If  this is not the structure of  
homophobia—and racism, and ableism—what is? One cannot think this chiasm today 
without hearing the belabored breathing of  Eric Garner and George Floyd.8 Elizabeth 
Bishop, another queer asthmatic, writes of  this unbearable dissymmetry in her 1955 poem 
“O Breath” (2008; cf. Lombardi 1992). While the world moves “almost intolerably” in the 
free bluster of  her lover’s breath, Bishop herself  is crushed by weight of  the closet; she can 
barely squeak out a livable life “beneath / within / if  never with” (77). It is a testament 
to the rigidity of  this chiasmic structure that Howard’s growing freedoms of  gender and 
sexuality constituted such a dramatic offense. As he moved to breathe more deeply and walk 
more fluidly, a vise clamped around his throat and 600 pounds of  river closed over his head. 
 In her self-styled contribution to a critical phenomenology of  walking, Gayle Salamon 
focuses on a different structure and a different case. Offering an account of  transphobia in 
The Life and Death of  Latisha King, Salamon (2018a) characterizes the damning logic by which a 
trans walk can precipitate a transphobic murder.9 King was a Black-identifying, mixed-race 
trans girl who was shot to death by a classmate, Brandon McInerney, in Oxnard, California, 
in 2008.10 She was fifteen years old. During the trial, King’s flagrantly free walk was trotted 
out not only as the trigger for her murder, but as a synecdoche for her gender and sexuality. 
Salamon patiently unpacks the how. How is it that King’s walk was felt, how did it fall, how did 
it function? How is it that her walk came to signify King’s offense, the sign of  her transgression? 
And ultimately, how is it that transphobia constrained her walking chances in advance? 
 Salamon grants, fundamentally, that “[a] walk is an elaborate and complex expression 
of  embodied life” (2018b, 51). For King, it came with ease and glee. She proudly waltzed 
through the school with an outsized fierceness and flamboyance that refused to be reduced 
to a mere “parading” or “sashaying” (86). In commanding her brown suede high-heeled 
boots, King became noticeably happier, as if, through the surety of  her feet, she found 
an uncertain home (Cunningham 2013). And yet, as Salamon states, “Her walk was a 
break with, and in, typicality itself,” the typicality crafted by compulsory cisheterosexuality 
(2018b, 66). After all, it is only in contrast to rectilinear angles and rigorous gestural scripts 
that the stylistic skew of  a queer walk can be measured. While that break was freeing for 
 
7 As Lucy, a 7-year-old asthmatic, reports: “Sometimes when I get up, I start falling down because I can’t 
walk that much because I can’t breathe.” See Lucy (2021).
8 I use the term “chiasm” here in the rhetorical, rather than strictly Merleau-Pontian, sense.
9 In Solitary Confinement, Guenther (2013) notes the intersubjective costs of  being made to walk on “neatly 
plotted sidewalks” (162) in abstraction from grass and stars; if  walking creates social and interpersonal 
depth, its diminution likewise weakens bonds of  the shared world (178).
10 Both King and Charlie Howard had recorded learning disabilities. How much the “behavioral 
problems” of  their queer genders and sexualities played in their diagnoses and treatment plans has yet to 
be fully established. See Zurn (2019).
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King, it was infuriating for most. Her walk was perceived by fellow classmates, teachers, 
and professionals as “an act, and often as an aggressive act, akin to a sexual advance or 
even a sexual assault” (30). When her walk was in full swing, she was perceived to be 
“throwing it at people,” provoking and even justifying violence (34). It wasn’t so much 
the lip gloss, the scarf, or the green prom dress, but the high-heeled boots; it wasn’t so 
much the pucker of  her lips, the lilt in her fingers, but the swish of  her gait. This is what 
made her “disgusting,” McInerney states (59). It was the slant, the tilt of  her body, and 
the shock of  her heels on the floor (51-52, 66-80). Within a critical phenomenological 
analysis, King’s walk is something experienced as subjectively as it is intersubjectively. Walks 
happen within a body, yes, but also between bodies. And that betweenness is structured in 
advanced by social discourses and institutions, themselves informed by ever longer histories. 
 How, then, do we walk? Critical phenomenology attends to the how of  the body, and 
to the how of  the body between bodies. How is walking, like breathing, a deeply embodied, 
rhythmic engagement with the world? And how is walking, not unlike breathing, already 
experienced within norms of  embodiment, norms of  gender and sexuality, race, class, and 
ability, as belonging to or breaking social codes and as therefore making room to breathe or 
refusing the right to breath? These are the difficult, entangled and entangling questions with 
which a critical phenomenologist is captivated. Attending to the mundane arts of  walking, 
the critical phenomenologist attends to the lived and limbed experience of  walking that floats 
submerged beneath everyday life, but also to the shockwaves by which certain walks pierce 
that fabric and become objects of  explicit attention, whether of  appreciation, observation, 
disdain, or persecution. In considering the anonymity that so often blankets the quotidian, 
Erwin Straus once wrote: “A healthy person does not ponder about breathing, seeing, 
walking. Infirmities of  breath, sight, or gait startle us” (1973, 232). But health is not the only 
invisibilizer, nor illness the sole arbiter of  shock. Homophobia, racism, and ableism, among 
other structures, do the work of  abnormalizing, of  calling out and putting down. Each 
participates, as Sunaura Taylor puts it, in the ever-expanding eugenic impulse that asserts, 
“This human doesn’t count enough as a human to be allowed to breathe” (Butler and Taylor 
2009, 206). This human doesn’t count enough as a human to be allowed to walk. In the 
struggle to breathe and in the struggle to walk, then, lies a fundamental truth, one built in the 
body just as much as between bodies. And it is to this that critical phenomenologists attend. 
III. THE WHEN AND THE WHERE OF WALKING
While critical phenomenology necessarily attends to the how of  walking, it must also attend 
to the when and the where of  walking. When does walking break into my consciousness and 
when does it recede into the background? Where am I when my walking sleeps in a blanket 
of  anonymity and when does it leap forward, insistently crowding out other physical and 
social perceptions? How does the when of  my existence (my history) and the where of  my 
existence (my geography) impact the significance and signification of  my walk? How do my 
when and where inform the style of  my walk and the stylization others make of  my walk? 
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Is it in the office, on the street, in the country or the city, is it at rush hour or at dawn? How 
does it modulate across this border or that, this crowd and context or that? How have 
historical and geographical legacies become sedimented in normalized gestures such that 
what stands out differs as though by dialect? And when and where can these sedimentations 
be resisted, even changed? In asking “When and where is it that we walk?” critical 
phenomenology attends still more deeply.   
 It is important to fully appreciate the differential distribution of  walking chances across 
time and place. And the method of  critical phenomenology grants as much. Phenomenology 
is rooted; critical theory is placed. Merleau-Ponty recognized the embodied constitution of  
objects by “walking around” his flat, while Foucault diagnosed disciplinary power by linking 
the eighteenth-century French soldier’s “walk [marcher]” to the rhythms of  French 
incarceration during the same period (2002, 235-6; Foucault 1976, 151-2). The importance 
of  place and time has not gone unappreciated in walking literature, especially within 
narratives of  walkers who walk the thin lines of  social belonging. George Yancy (2013), for 
example, in his ruminations on “walking while Black,” recalls being profiled as a young boy, 
walking the streets of  North Philadelphia in the late 1970s, with a telescope under his arm. 
Erica Violet Lee (2016) reflects upon the difference between walking as an Indigenous 
woman in downtown Saskatchewan and on the prairies themselves. Sunaura Taylor remarks 
upon the pleasures of  walking in her wheelchair in San Francisco, where a certain level of  
access is normalized (Butler and Taylor 2009, 189). Even Charlie Howard was free to walk 
as he liked in the Unitarian Universalist Church, but not down State Street, in rural Bangor, 
Maine, in the early 1980s. It is, indeed, this specific temporal and geographical confluence 
that made linking arms with his friend Roy Ogden so dangerous. Many a queer knows the 
feeling: the simultaneous rush of  relief  and risk through one’s body, all senses heightened, 
an inner relaxation swaddled in full-body tension, the cradled hand soft but the shoulders 
hard, the feet ready to swerve, the eyes laughing and searching all at once. Time and place 
matter.   
 Sara Ahmed tells the story of  being stopped by the police in a “leafy suburb” of  
Adelaide, Australia, in the early 1970’s (1998, 115). She was fourteen and walking without 
shoes. They read her as a poor, Aboriginal girl who might have been responsible for “some 
break-ins in the area recently.” Her brown skin placed her as out of  place. Her bare feet 
pronounced her walk as illegitimate. After she denied being Aboriginal, but refused to 
explain her brown skin, they winked at her and asked if  it was just “a sun tan.” She insisted 
on her right to walk, to walk without shoes, to walk where she pleased; she dropped the 
name of  her private girl’s school and willed herself  to be read as white. They let her go with 
a warning. When she returned home, her sister said she needed to lose weight so she 
wouldn’t get mistaken, again, as Aboriginal. The scene ends in tears. Ahmed carefully 
unravels this story, waiting patiently beside each thread—gender, sexuality, race, class, body 
size—and thinking carefully through the braid of  complicity and resistance, of  her smiles 
and her refusals. Her walk could only pierce the sheen of  everyday life as it did under 
certain circumstances: in a time and a place where police intervention and racial profiling 
are routine; in a time and a place where Indigenous people are socially present, geographically 
segregated, and historically criminalized; and in a time and a place where Ahmed’s own 
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mixed South Asian heritage was unreadable, unthinkable. It is in this context that she was 
perceived as an outsider, a thief  on the run. Insofar as her walk was perceived as a threat, 
she was always already walking under threat. How this happens, and how this feels, are 
temporally and locationally contingent.     
 Attending to the when and where certainly invites us to think more critically, but it also 
opens up new phenomenological possibilities. Let us return to Latisha King for a moment, 
and the significance of  her walk in different locales. Place is important. King’s walk became 
salient at school in multiple contexts, whether she walked down the hallway and into the 
classroom, walked onto the basketball court, ran around at recess, or traipsed in and out of  
the principal’s office.11 And it continued to be salient in the court room in Chatsworth, LA, 
where it was repeatedly reprised and replayed. While Salamon makes much of  these 
locations to place her phenomenological analyses, attention should also be turned to the 
town of  Oxnard itself.12 Oxnard is a long-segregated town, with significant Mexican, Black, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino populations (Maulhardt 2005; Garcia 2018; Barajas 2012). 
Walking as a Black trans girl in a predominantly Latinx school, with majority white teachers, 
King’s walk was inescapably enmeshed in the local policing of  race and ethnicity—woven 
across gender, class, religion, and ability. But King also walked in the town of  Oxnard some 
fifty years after Lucy Hicks Anderson, one of  the earliest recorded Black trans women in 
the US (Snorton 2018, 145-51). And this invites a critical, phenomenological turn. What is 
it for a dehistoricized trans life, only ever conceptualized as one at a time, to belong to a 
lineage? What is it for a trans walk to belong to a lineage of  other trans walks? Did Latisha 
know? Who would have told her? How might the fact of  Anderson’s existence have enlivened 
her limbs, put a spring in her step, changed how her walk felt and functioned in the 
intersubjective spaces of  school and shelter, friends and phobias? What is it when a trans 
walk is clocked because the onlooker has seen a trans walk before? And what is it for a trans 
person to learn to walk again? What rebalancing, rerooting, lilting and tilting, grounding 
and squaring occur as we look to one another and our ancestors to breathe new life into our 
embodied selves bodying forth?   
 But there is still greater, richer context for King’s walk across Oxnard’s history. As a 
place in time, Oxnard invites us to think about the critical conditions and first-person 
experiences of  walking away and walking back, walking out and walking in. Early in 1942, 
hundreds of  Japanese Americans from in and around Oxnard were forced to relocate to 
internment camps across the United States. This forced walking away, however, was answered 
by a chosen walking back. Several years later, most of  them returned (Maulhardt 2005). Well 
before and after these internment policies, however, Oxnard was a place of  labor organizing. 
From the Japanese/Mexican strike of  1903 to the citrus strike of  1940 and the Chavez-led 
labor strikes of  1970, in which “thousands of  defiant workers walked off their jobs,” Oxnard 
has been a place of  walking out—walking out of  factories, out of  fields, out of  frames. But it 
has also been a place of  walking in (Daniel 1995, 393; Barajas 2012; Almaguer 1995). From 
 
11 King could walk as she pleased at the children’s shelter Casa Pacifica, but not walk onto the basketball 
court, “a sacred space for masculinity,” to state her queer desire for McInerney. See Corbett (2017, 164).
12 Andrea Pitts (2021) begins this work in their commentary on The Life and Death of  Latisha King.
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labor unions to Occupy Oxnard, there is a long history of  walking into the room, walking 
into the assembly, walking into the facility, the administrative building, or the gates, to get 
things done, make things different, and claim voice. Did Latisha King not also walk in 
protest? Did she ever walk out, walk away? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is 
certain that King protested by walking back and walking in, to the bullies, to the school, to the 
transphobic teachers, and to her friends. Commentators appreciate the relentlessness of  the 
slurs thrown at her, but perhaps not the relentlessness of  her own returns. Indeed, the 
embodied sense of  walking back to and back in deserves deeper consideration. So much of  
our framework for walking is forward leaning, pressing down the path, toward the next turn 
and on to the next horizon. What can we appreciate when we turn that ‘round? To what 
lost phenomenologies of  walking are we therewith invited when we hover at the back of  
walking, in walking back?   
 To think walking from a critical phenomenological perspective, we must not think only 
of  the how, but also of  the when and the where. Too often, walking is not thought, but 
simply done. And too often still, when walking is thought, it is thought as the activity of  a 
universal subject, whether in the service of  utilitarian ends or ruddy freedom. The how 
pushes us beneath a simplistic who and what and why, demanding a more finely grained 
analysis of  the form walking takes and the formations it sustains. Pushing still deeper, the 
when and the where locate those forms and formations, anchoring them to habits and 
horizons as much as to institutions and inscriptions. Here lie the questions that form the 
trails and gullies of  a critical phenomenology of  walking. And those questions aim not to 
settle, but to unsettle, and to unsettle consistently, as a practice, a path of  thinking, a way of  
responding that examines as it listens. 
IV. THE POWER OF WALKING
There can be a certain tendency toward passivity in a critical phenomenology, as a 
description of  first-person experiences constrained in advance by social structures, 
institutions, and histories—as if  things are experienced this way because things are made to 
be experienced this way. Full stop. But there is a necessary activity embedded in the critical 
tradition, and it is imperative that this element not be lost in the critical phenomenological 
enterprise. This is the root of  critical phenomenology’s ameliorative potential. Critical 
phenomenology can facilitate liberation insofar as it is a way of  thinking, or of  moving in 
conceptual space, that attends to the differences of  first-person, intersubjective experiences 
and the sedimentations of  structural investments. Thinking those differences and those 
sedimentations provides not only a way to diagnose the present but also to possibilize a different 
future. To assess constructions of  habit and inscription, as much as to find ways out from 
under them. While that analytical work is important, I want to propose a third sense in 
which critical phenomenology can be ameliorative and that is in its capacity to witness. The 
critical phenomenological project is a way of  moving in the world and a way of  listening to 
how the world moves. It has the capacity not simply to condition future ameliorative work 
but to witness ameliorative work already in play. And walking is a case in point.   
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 One of  the purchases of  a critical phenomenology of  walking is its capacity not only to 
diagnose the histories and institutions that police the place and performance of  walking, 
but to thickly describe the ways in which that policing is differentially distributed and 
experienced based on the gender, sexuality, race and ethnicity, class, and disability status of  
the one who walks. It matters who walks, how they walk, when and where. And, if  the 
testaments of  Sara Ahmed, Judith Butler, Charlie Howard, Latisha King, Erica Violet Lee, 
Sunaura Taylor, and George Yancy are any indication, understanding how walking appears 
and how it functions is a critical component of  the project of  social liberation. But critical 
phenomenology does not only attend to the fact of  walking, or to the feelings of  and the 
forces that impinge on the gait (and how they might be thought and done otherwise). It also 
attends to the forces generated by that gait. Walking as actant. But also: a specific sort of  
walking as a specific sort of  actant. Walkers from marginalized groups are not simply victims 
of  oppression and sustainers of  harm in the delimitation of  their walks; they are also 
revolutionaries, rewriters of  history in the very pitch of  their gait. They reconfigure space, 
rearrange horizons, and fracture constraints. Critical phenomenology has the honor of  
bearing witness to walking as itself  an act of  resistance and re-formation.  
 Michel de Certeau (1984) eloquently insists that walking is an act of  resistance. When 
he thinks about walking, he conceptualizes it in an urban context. Government 
administrators, city personnel, and urban planners all craft and read the text of  a city as it 
should be, or as it was meant to be. But walkers—rambling down city streets, jaywalking 
from one side to the other, loitering where they will, taking shortcuts, and building pragmatic 
paths by the sheer force of  their feet—recraft and reread the city as it needs to be, in the 
very moment of  its use. “Footsteps,” de Certeau writes, “give their shape to spaces. They 
weave places together” (97). Walkers actualize what the city planners planned, and yet 
differently. Against the projections of  the city, walkers pitch practice. And against the written 
text of  the city, walking speaks. Much like everyday speech, walking obeys certain rules and 
abandons others, innovates one moment and turns an indifferent ear the next. “Walking 
affirms, suspects, tries out, transgresses, respects, etc., the trajectories it ‘speaks’” (99). It 
triangulates need and desire, curiosity and pragmatism, and transforms paths accordingly. 
As such, de Certeau insists, there is a “long poem of  walking” that lays thickly atop a path’s 
literal geography (101, 105). Walking enunciates as it wills, in resistant relation to the city’s 
ought’s and must’s. And it is in this resistant relation that walking cultivates its own style and 
sense. It cuts a curb like it turns a phrase, relishing in the license one can still take within 
signal constraints. And it is for this reason that walking, as a practice of  everyday life, has 
an implicit revolutionary power.     
 To determine the resistant quality of  the walk, however, it matters who walks, how, 
when and where. Walking, as an act of  resistance, shapes and reshapes space. And yet, that 
work of  shaping and reshaping supervenes on the walkers in question. In her response to 
de Certeau and the long tradition of  universalizing the walker, María Lugones (2003) insists 
on the specificity of  “streetwalkers.” Streetwalkers (callejeras), for Lugones, are at home and 
at work in the streets, as much as they are unhomed and out of  work on the streets. As those 
who live “at the border, abyss, edge, shore of  countersense, of  emergent sense,” streetwalkers 
themselves have “ill-defined ‘edges’” (236, 209). They are multiplicitous subjects coming in 
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and out of  being in deeply intersubjective, interdependent, and intercorporeal relations. 
Streetwalkers live and move in hangouts (207, 220, 213). In this context, hangouts are not 
networking conferences or business socials. Streetwalkers hangout by making home and 
making space in the streets, hanging out where they are not supposed to, with those they are 
not supposed to, in ways they are not supposed to. And it is in this place of  impurity and 
illegitimacy, and in this very movement of  mixing and mottling, that streetwalkers critically 
remake and retheorize the world (Hoagland 2019). Through “the alert embodiment of  
walking and bumping, among and into one another,” Lugones writes, streetwalkers generate 
the “enigmatic vocabularies and gestures” capable of  illuminating the “poli-vocal, poli-
logical complexity” of  their lives (2003, 215, 221, 224). They do this to contest the meaning 
of  the possible, and to create it anew. And this, she insists, is not simply walking. This is a 
doing and a thinking. This is resistant streetwalker theorizing.   
 If  the footsteps of  a normate body give their shape to spaces, certainly the wayfinding 
of  non-normate bodies recontours space in a uniquely resistant way. And critical 
phenomenology can catch that, the way marginalized bodies walk and bump into one 
another, reweaving gesture and carriage. Working in the groove Lugones laid, Kim Hall 
(2021) turns a critical phenomenological eye on their own gait, which they call “a limping 
swagger or a swaggering limp.” Born with “what has been called a malformed hip joint,” 
or a shortened acetabulum, Hall went through a range of  early corrective surgeries, braces, 
and physical therapy. In a sense, these were successful: Hall walks. In another sense, they 
were unsuccessful: Hall walks “with a difference.” There is something not normal, something 
disorienting about their walk. Strangers ask, “What’s wrong? What happened? What did 
you do to yourself ?” Critical phenomenology—specifically a crip critical phenomenology—
can analyze the structures that construct the meaning of  ability (and disability) in advance, 
and that, in so doing, shape bodily habits and possibilities. The very structure of  what a 
body is and what it can do is not born but made. Critical phenomenology can analyze that 
making, but it can also testify. “Limping-swaggering along,” Hall writes, “I forge a path 
between disability and ability where I live, forging paths that rework and resist dominant 
spaces and meanings.” Their queer crip walk undoes, with each step, the ableist and 
cisheteronormative construction of  space, bodies, and their interrelation. It upends the 
presumption of  the universal subject who walks, instead striking out unsteadily, unevenly, 
with a hint of  weakness and non-normative sexuality, into a space that does not expect it. 
Critical phenomenology can witness that walk; it can catch sight of  that resistance.   
 Critical phenomenology must, in the last instance, attend to the revolutionary character 
of  walking. While walking is, indeed, a horizon of  consciousness and a site of  oppression, 
it is also a syntax of  resistance. It is not just that Latisha King experiences her walk, or that 
her walk is experienced by others awash in homophobic and transphobic, racist and ableist 
frameworks, but that her walk does something in the world, realigning embodiments and 
rearranging horizons. It does something and it says something. It is a saying, a responding 
that examines as it listens. And this is how walking comes to matter.   
 Critical phenomenology is poised to attend with unusual attention not only to the body 
schema, intercorporeality, and lifeworld of  walkers, but also to the socio-political structures 
and histories that shape them and which they in turn shape. Phenomenology and critical 
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theory both developed as a kind of  thinking that refuses to abstract and consume, but 
chooses rather to take theoretical steps that are, each and every one of  them, a greeting, a 
welcome, a walking alongside the complexity of  the patterns that we see and according to 
which we see. Together they model a becoming-haptic in the space of  thought. In the 
thought world. Their questions feeling the way. What I have offered here, then, are but a 
few of  the footpaths and flight ways of  a critical phenomenology of  walking. 
“Fag! Dyke! Fuckin Faggot!” A white supped up truck, jammed with three heads, capped much like mine, 
their bodies no doubt jeaned and booted much like mine. Zoomed past. It was a commercial intersection in 
the Philly suburbs some years back. I felt wooden and out of  joint, extended limbs awkwardly mimicking 
locomotion. Like my heel hit the street before my femur hit my knee. I felt hot in my face. And like I couldn’t 
stand up straight. Even as I squared my shoulders, their parts rounded and sunk, as if  ducking the next 
hurling word... or worse. Would they circle back? Did they have friends? Do they know where I live? I kept 
wanting to look up at every passing car in case. But also not to look at anyone, for fear of  the shame of  
someone having witnessed. Or having seen. I felt a sudden unhomed-ness from the world, as if  the sidewalk 
itself  was prying me off to flick me away. I was not alone at the time, but I do not remember who I was with 
or what they said or did. In that moment, their existence was erased from my scene of  perception, not even a 
blip on the horizon. I tucked down a residential street. I passed the Trump signs and the Quaker retreat center. 
Windows felt like gaping eyes. Did that just happen? My shoulders, my feet said yes. I stopped walking for 
a while after that.
 
There is nothing special about my story. That’s the point. It’s not special. It’s not the first 
time or the worst time. It’s just there. There in their bodies and here in mine. And yet, this 
is not simply the story of  a particular phenomenological experience of  walking, informed 
by structures of  homotransphobia in early twenty-first century East Coast living, for a 
relatively young white, able-bodied, transmasculine person not dressed to impress. It is 
also the story of  just such a person traversing that intersection, writing that space, walking 
that story. And walking out. Walking in a way that is readable—legible as illegitimate. And 
walking that way out into the world, where room and space have to be made, possibilities 
changed and corporealities refigured. Citing Lourdes Ashley Hunter, Susan Stryker (2016; 
cf. Hunter 2015) states, “Every breath a trans person takes is an act of  revolution.” So, 
too, is every step. “Each breath insists on a new ordering of  the world,” Stryker continues; 
it is “the instrumentalization of  a contested necessity of  life as a resistant and defiant act 
of  survival.” So, too, is each step. It is a will to move and be moved differently. And to 
scramble and conspire together for another world. In this sense, it matters that we breathe. 
It matters that we—the many we’s whose walks are forbidden, hassled, constrained, policed, 
criminalized, derided, and snuffed out—it matters that we walk. 
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